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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY INSTABILITY BETWEEN THE WARS:
STRUCTURAL FLAWS OR MISGUIDED POLICIES?
ABSTRACT
This paper reaueses the history of the internatioD8l monetary system between the wars. It confirms
the generality of several widely held interpretatio1lll of recent experience with floating ezchange rates.
There is a positive lIlIIIOCiation between nominal e~ rate flexibility and nominal e~ rate
variability. There is a positive lI8lIOCiation between nominal e~ratevariability and real exchange
rate variability. But policies of intervention which reduce nominal ezchange rate variability do not
guarantee a proportionate reduction in nominal e~ rate risk or in real~ rate variability
and unpredictability. A credible commitment to a stable intervention rule is needed to deliver these
benefits.
The paper then goes on to COJIIIider four potential explanations for the collapse of the fixed rate regime
that prevailed from 1926 through 1931: (1) failure to play by the "rules of the game: (2) inadequate
internatioD8l economic leadership by the United States, (3) inadequate cooperation among the leading
gold standard countries, and (4) structural features of a system in which reserves were comprised of
both gold and foreign ezchange. It coocludes by aseessing the role of the internatioD8l monetary system
in the Great Depression.
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